Gregory's Doctrine of Conceptualization.
Gregory's doctrine of the names of God evolves from his theory
of conceptualization and nomenclature in general. This doctrine was developed to
oppose the teachings of Eunomius but there is no reason to assume that polemical
considerations forced Gregory to express his views only incompletely. There are
also no grounds for considering Gregory a sceptic or a nominalist, or for
asserting that his theory of names differs in its basic premises from his
religious and metaphysical systems. What appears to be "nominalism" in Gregory's
theory is really only the logical consequence of his use of negative attribution
to designate the Divinity. Basically Gregory's theory of names is an elaboration
of Plato's ideas on the same subject. The views of Eunomius are comparable to
those expressed by Cratylus in Plato's dialogue of the same name.
Gregory considers that words are the "inventions of the human
intellect." For this reason there are many languages. "If the law of nature had
ordered names to come forth to us from the objects themselves, in the way that
plants grow from seeds and roots," Gregory writes, "then all people would speak
one language." The Tower of Babel does not imply that many languages were
created by God. He simply allowed the nations to distinguish themselves by
developing different languages. Gregory sees language as a product of man's
creativity. The "invention" of language by man was not arbitrary or capricious
but was accomplished through the natural faculty of reason. God gave man the
gift of language as an intellectual capacity. "He gave us this faculty and then
we ourselves create house, stool, sword, plow, and whatever else we need in
life."
Man's faculty or potential for language is the work of our
Creator." Man can realize this potential in a free and creative way. God does
not direct the physical movement of His creatures nor does He sit like a teacher
of grammar to direct our use of language. Language, sounds, and the conceptions
they express are all created by men through the Divinely bestowed faculty of
"invention,” επινοια. Gregory follows Basil the
Great in defining invention as “the intellect's ability to discover the unknown
by seeking to know the things removed from it with the help of deductions drawn
from the things which are most immediate to the object of inquiry.” Invention is the creative power of
thought, a “more exhaustive analysis of the object of thought.” Instead of
επινοια, invention, Gregory occasionally uses the term διανοια,
judgment.
Invention is not merely fabrication, fantasy, or caprice.
Nomenclature presupposes an object to be named and things are named so that we
can point them out and so that our cognition and knowledge of them can be
consolidated. Therefore names are not arbitrary because if they were they would
not be names or signs. They would be devoid of sense and meaning. Naming things
entails intention and premeditation. "The intellectual faculty of the soul has
been given to us from God. Then it begins to move and look at things by itself
and, to keep its knowledge from being blurred or imprecise, it puts an
individual stamp on every thing, indicating this stamp by means of sound."
Gregory distinguishes the perception of objects from knowledge
of them. "It is impossible for us to always have everything that exists in front
of our eyes. There are some things that we know because they are always before
us but we know other things because we have imprinted them on our memories.
Nothing can be preserved by memory unless we have a name to designate the object
we want to remember so that we can distinguish it from other objects."
We give names because we need to distinguish the conceptions we
form from our experience, which is constantly changing. Names are unnecessary
and even impossible for God because "His Wisdom and Strength have no difficulty
in encompassing everything that exists in its individuality." God contemplates
the entirety of the world and instantly comprehends it without the help of
names. The nature of human faculty for conception and nomenclature is such that
the ultimate essence of things, even created things, cannot be known and named
by man. The reason is that things are recognized in their relationships, in
their activity, and in the effect they have on other things. When we talk about
them we do not designate their true nature but only the properties and qualities
we can discern in them. We do not know the essence of things because their
foundation is known only to God. "Scripture does not examine the essence of
creation because this is superfluous arid brings no advantage. The human
intellect cannot know the nature and source of creation because such knowledge
would have to be radiant with the full majesty, power, and glory of the
Creator." Therefore, "We know by means of our senses only as much of the
elements of the world as is useful for us. We do not know what their essence is
and this ignorance brings us no harm."
A name is a sign or a mark of a thing σημειον. It has a connection with its object.
"Words which are invented have some thing in common with their objects." In
attempting to define the common element between the name and its object, Gregory
proposes that this connection is established by the free and creative faculty of
the intellect. Names are invented for things and united to them but they do not
arise from things. A name is not the thing itself, but neither is it completely
independent of it. A name is not an hypostasis. "Every name is the mark or sign
of an object or idea but it does not exist and cannot be conceived of
independently and by itself."
Source:
No comments:
Post a Comment